)>IJH=?J This paper analyses the performance of a large cross-section of UK pension funds. We¯nd strong evidence of clustering in ex post average performance across pension fund portfolios as a whole as well as within asset classes.
Introduction
A large literature in¯nance has studied the investment performance of US mutual funds, predominantly those invested in US equities, and some attention has also been paid to US pension funds. However, investment performance by institutions outside the US has been much less intensively researched. This omission is potentially important since di®erences in institutional and legal frameworks and, indeed, di®ering investment cultures and compensation schemes make it far from clear that the same¯ndings would obtain in other venues. Inevitably many of the US performance studies have used overlapping data sets, so it is important to test the robustness of the US¯ndings on a genuinely new data set.
Incentives in the UK pension fund industry are quite di®erent from those in the US. Perhaps surprisingly, there is rarely a change in fund manager, although the terms of mandates or investment contracts sometimes change. To be sure, some of this stability arises from the expense associated with changing management. However, the principal cause appears to be the e®orts of fund managers to maintain the con¯dence of their clients through consistent track records based on good relative performance.
Some institutional features of the UK pension fund industry a®ect managerial incentives in important ways. First, the management industry is highly concentrated with the top¯ve management houses accounting for 80 per cent of total assets under management (Lambert (1998) ). Second, UK pension fund managers only have a weak incentive to add value and they are largely unconstrained in the way in which they attempt to do so. Third, the long-term survival of fund managers is determined by their relative performance against their peer-group rather than by their absolute performance. Finally, most UK pension fund managers earn fees related solely to the value of assets under management, and not to their relative performance against either a predetermined benchmark or their peer-group (i.e., there is, in general, no speci¯c penalty for underperforming and no speci¯c reward for outperforming an agreed upon benchmark).
Another virtue of the UK experiment concerns the nature of the benchmarks used to correct for systematic risk. Benchmark ine±ciency is a central theme of both the theoretical and empirical literatures on performance evaluation, because of the di±culty in distinguishing benchmark ine±ciency from abnormal performance. As an empirical matter, Lehmann and Modest (1987) , Grinblatt and Titman (1989) , and Elton, Gruber, Das, and Hlavka (1993) have found that measured US equity mutual fund performance can depend critically on the benchmark used in the analysis. Elton, Gruber, Das, and Hlavka (1993) and Ferson and Schadt (1996) highlight some of the misspeci¯cation problems associated with performance measurement that arise when the funds under consideration hold assets, such as international equities and bonds, that are excluded from the benchmark index. ! Our data permit us to deal with some of these issues. Since we know the structure of the asset allocations of the included pension funds, we can use benchmarks that do not su®er from defects of asset coverage. That is, we can compare asset class returns with asset-speci¯c benchmarks in both unconditional and conditional single-index models and with appropriate multiple-index benchmarks that represent all of the di®erent asset categories actually held by the pension funds. We also have data on peer-group benchmarks, so we can assess the importance of relative performance evaluation, a topic that has received some recent attention (Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) ).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 investigates the crosssectional variation in the performance of UK pension funds. The performance conditional on fund characteristics, such as size and past performance, is investigated in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes.
The Performance of UK Pension Funds
Our data, provided by The WM Company (a key performance measurement service in the UK), consists of monthly observations on the returns of 306 UK pension funds in eight asset categories " covering the period 1986 -1994. The sample is complete in the sense that it contains all of the funds with no missing data that maintained the same single, externally-appointed fund management group throughout the period 1986-1994. We examine the total returns on the portfolios, as well as the separate returns within eight asset classes. As benchmarks for evaluating performance, WM uses both external, independently calculated indices (e.g., the Financial Times Actuaries (FTA) All-Share Index for UK equities), as well as WM universe indices based on value-weighted portfolios of the population of funds tracked by WM. The latter peer-group indices are commonly used by the industry to assess funds' medium-to long-term performance.
A potential problem with our data set is the survivorship bias induced by the restriction to funds that maintained the same manager over the whole sample. # Funds were excluded from the sample supplied to us for one of¯ve reasons. First, funds that switched managers are excluded from the sample, potentially the most pernicious source of survivorship bias. Second, company takeovers often mean that funds are merged and merged funds are excluded. Third, funds might withdraw themselves from the WM measurement service with no explanation. Fourth, funds that switched from in-house to external management are eliminated because this constitutes a change in management. Fifth, some fund management groups permit WM to measure only a proportion of the funds in their stable in order to save costs and occasionally they will rotate these funds, a practice called 'dynamization', and such funds are dropped from our sample. The last four sources are often independent of actual performance, so elimination of funds often occurs for reasons unrelated to survivorship bias.
To address this concern, we compared the value-weighted total returns of the funds in our sample by asset class and in aggregate with the corresponding value-weighted returns of the entire population of funds in the WM universe (1034 at the end of 1994). There was no systematic tendency for the returns in our sample to exceed those in the whole WM universe, either on average or year-to-year. If survivorship bias was pernicious, we would expect such outperformance, particularly towards the end of the sample as the omitted returns from managers dropped due to poor performance are subtracted from returns in the whole universe but not from those of our sample.
A¯nal reason why survivorship bias does not appear to be an important issue in our sample can be gleaned from a comparison of the evolution of the portfolio weights of the funds in our sample with those in the WM universe. The aggregate asset allocations in our sample and in the WM universe were nearly always within one percentage point of each other for each asset class and for each year, $ which explains the similarity in the performance of the two groups each year and indicates that both sets of managers followed similar market timing strategies. See Blake, Lehmann, and Timmermann (1998) for more details. % Table 1 presents some regularities in average fund performance. Panel A pro-vides several fractiles (5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90%, 95%) and the minimum and maximum of the cross-sectional distribution of average total returns on the seven most important asset classes as well as on the total portfolio. As is readily apparent, there is remarkably little cross-sectional variation in annualized total returns across the funds in our sample. The semi-interquartile range runs from 11.47 percent to 12.59 percent per year and less than 300 basis points separates the funds in the 5th and 95th percentiles. To be sure, there is somewhat more cross-sectional variability in particular asset classes. For example, the annualized semi-interquartile range for UK equity returns is of the order of 150 basis points and the corresponding 5th-95th percentile range is 400 basis points. The corresponding ranges are larger for international equity returns, with a semiinterquartile range of more than 200 basis points and a 5th-95th percentile range of 450 basis points. However, these ranges are small compared with those observed in other performance evaluation settings, such as with US equity mutual funds. This comparatively narrow range of cross-sectional variability suggests that any di®erences in performance ability across the funds in our sample must show up conditionally since an unconditional distribution with low variability can conceal highly variable distributions once nontrivial conditioning information is taken into account. However, Panel B of Table 1 shows that the requisite variability does not emerge from simple risk-adjustment procedures such as basic Jensen regressions:
where r ijt is the return on the i'th fund's j'th asset class in period t, r ft is the return on a one month T-bill, and r mjt is the return on the j'th external index in period t. In this panel, the Jensen ® ijt and¯i jt are time-invariant. As is readily apparent, the average alpha di®ers from the raw mean return in each asset class, but the shape of the cross-sectional distribution of the alphas is virtually identical to that of raw average returns across funds in each asset class and for the aggregate portfolio. For all of the asset classes that comprised more than¯ve per cent of the fund and for the overall portfolio, the semi-interquartile ranges of the sample Jensen alphas are within about¯ve per cent of those of the corresponding average returns.
As a general proposition, relative rankings will change little whether we rank on the basis of average returns, mean-adjusted returns or on conventional Jensen alphas. Consequently, any diligent search for abnormal performance in these funds must consider alternative risk-adjustment procedures. The next subsection provides a detailed examination of the domestic equity portfolios of our funds, using Jensen-style regressions that admit time-varying alphas and betas. This focus on the equity component facilitates comparisons with the existing academic literature which mainly covers equity mutual funds. In addition, domestic equities are the most important asset class, accounting for more than half of the aggregate pension fund portfolio and for an even greater fraction of its performance. The subsequent subsection reports ex post performance measures from basic Jensen regressions for the other asset categories and from a multipleindex Jensen regression for the total portfolio on the grounds that this is likely to be more appropriate for the aggregate portfolio.
UK Equity Performance against Single-Index Benchmarks
We investigate UK equity fund performance with¯ve versions of (1). The¯rst is the original Jensen regression with time-invariant alphas and betas, which provides performance measures conditional only on di®erences in unconditional betas. Second, we follow Ferson and Schadt (1996) by permitting betas to vary over time, allowing for predictable variation in risk exposures and, implicitly, in benchmark returns, on the grounds that managers should not be credited for performance based on changing portfolio weights in the light of costless public information. & Third, we allow for predictable variation in alphas as well, after Christopherson, Ferson, and Glassman (1995) . ' Fourth, we add the monthly returns on the Hoare-Govett small cap index to the unconditional Jensen regression, since the value-weighted nature of the UK equity index might bias the alphas. Finally, following Treynor and Mazuy (1966), we added the squared excess benchmark return to the unconditional Jensen regression since all the above procedures are suspect if managers possess market timing ability. If managers possess market timing ability, they should earn positive excess returns when benchmark returns are large in absolute value, while selection skills should show up as positive alphas in the absence of benchmark error under plausible assumptions.
The behavior of the Jensen alphas from these models should di®er depending on the nature of the underlying economic environment and the hypothesized market timing ability of managers. If the investment opportunity set is unchanging (that is, if benchmark returns and their¯rst few moments are time-invariant) and managers have no market timing ability, all models using the same benchmark will produce alphas and betas with the same expected values. In particular, the cross-sectional distribution of the alphas should be identical across models, holding the benchmark constant. The interpretation is more problematic if the investment opportunity set is time-varying (that is, if the mean, volatility, and, perhaps, higher moments of the benchmark returns exhibit predictable variation). The Jensen alphas and betas will be biased estimates of their unconditional means in this case, even if managers possess no market timing ability, if fund betas move with the relevant conditional moments of the benchmark return. Hence, conditioning on public information, as in the second and third models and on the squared excess market return as in the¯fth model, can materially alter the distribution of the alphas to the extent that betas are negatively correlated with population alphas. Finally, conditioning on public information might eliminate some of the cross-sectional variation in measured alphas to the extent that fund betas are correlated with conditional market risk premiums and volatilities. Table 2 reports a number of summary statistics describing the cross-sectional distribution of the alphas from these models. We provide several fractiles of their distribution as well as their maximum and minimum values and their associated Bonferroni p-values. We also present the mean alpha and its t-statistic.
Several regularities emerge from these models. Disregarding the last column of Table 2 , average performance is economically and statistically negligible, the largest alpha being only 33 basis points annualized. Similarly, the fraction of funds with positive alphas is less than 50% for all models except the conditional alpha model, where 58% of the estimates were positive, with 8% signi¯cant at the 5% level. In addition, the most extreme outperformer and underperformer had one-sided t-statistics with Bonferroni p-values well below the 0.0001 level, except for the marginal signi¯cance level of 0.015 for the largest outperformer identi¯ed by the Ferson-Schadt regression. Taken together, and ignoring any concern about benchmark error and survivorship bias, there is little evidence of abnormal performance on average in this industry or indeed much evidence of extreme out-or underperformance that is signi¯cant at any reasonable level.
However, the main regularity concerns the shape of the cross-sectional distribution. The annualized semi-interquartile range in each of these models is about 150 basis points, virtually identical to that of raw UK equity returns at 149 basis points. Conditioning on alternative models for beta changes the location of the cross-sectional distribution of raw returns, but leaves its shape virtually unchanged. Pension funds with similar performance by any of these measures also have similar risk exposures. Moreover, any shifts in their betas had su±-ciently low correlations with benchmark returns or publicly-available conditioning information as to leave the cross-sectional distribution of the ex post alphas unchanged. ! Market timing switches among asset classes do not contribute materially to cross-sectional variation in average equity returns within the UK pension fund industry.
Of course, UK managers are evaluated relative to peer-group benchmarks, not by any risk-adjustment procedure. We replicate WM's performance evaluation methodology by comparing the equity performance with that of the WM2000 UK Equity Index (r ¤ mjt ):
In contrast with the previous methods, the peer-group approach requires no estimation of risk exposures, since it implicitly sets¯i jt to unity. Recent empirical evidence (e.g. Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) ) suggests the importance of relative performance evaluation for US equity managers as well. Table 2 reveals that this UK pension fund industry practice signi¯cantly alters the appearance of managerial e®ectiveness. Nearly two-thirds of the funds outperformed the relative equity benchmark with 48 funds (16% of the total) having relative performance alphas that are signi¯cant at the 5% level. Many fewer funds earned negative alphas and fewer than 15 of these were signi¯cant at the 5% level. Average performance was positive: the mean alpha estimate was 0.459% per year with a t-value of 4.04. Of course, relative performance evaluation only changes the location of the cross-sectional distribution of raw average returns, leaving the shape unchanged.
Relative performance evaluation is a key part of any explanation of the industrial organization of the UK pension fund industry. With two-thirds of our funds in the top half of the class, it is perhaps unsurprising that our sample consists of managers who have maintained the longest continuous client relationships within the WM universe, 14 although this observation begs obvious questions regarding trustee attention to poor performance and external benchmarks.
Performance in Other Asset Categories and the Total Portfolio
We conducted comparable analyses across asset classes with single-asset class benchmarks and obtained¯ndings similar to those reported for UK equity, c.f. Panel B in Table 1 . 15 That is, the average Jensen alpha sometimes varied across risk-adjustment procedures, but the shape of the cross-sectional distribution of ex post performance measures remains largely unchanged and thus very similar to that of raw and mean-adjusted returns. Since we have data on asset-class-speci¯c benchmarks, we use the multi-factor version of the standard Jensen regression for the total portfolio, comparing the excess total return of the i'th fund with the excess returns on the entire set of indices:
where M is the number of asset classes for which a benchmark index is available.
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Hence ® ip is the multi-factor analogue of the standard Jensen measure and the potential pitfalls arising from market timing ability parallels that in the single index case. Overall, UK pension fund managers tended to slightly underperform in our sample: 138 funds had positive alphas with only 9 (3% of the total) signi¯cant at the 5% level and 168 funds had negative alphas, of which 6 (2%) were signi¯cant. Their semi-interquartile range ran from -0.71% to 0.44%, an annualized range (of 115 basis points) that di®ered from that of the raw returns by only three basis points (c.f. Table 1 ). The alpha estimate for the equally-weighted portfolio was a minuscule -0.11%, with a t-value of -0.17. The left tail of the cross-sectional distribution is neither long nor dense and the Bonferroni p-value for the most underperforming fund had a marginal signi¯cance level of only 0.62. Only the Bonferroni test statistic for the most successful fund is suggestive of abnormal performance, with a p-value less than 0.00001, indicating sharp rejection of the null of no outperforming funds at any conventional level. Of course, this rejection could still re°ect benchmark error and survivorship bias as well.
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Relative performance evaluation for the overall portfolio parallels that of the equity case: 197 funds (64%) outperformed the peer-group benchmark, 41 (13%) signi¯cantly so at the 5% level. Average fund performance was quite close to that of the peer-group benchmark, being an economically and statistically negligible 6 basis points below the benchmark return, but underperformed the external benchmark by a more substantial 45 basis points.
Performance and Fund Characteristics
The preceding results reveal two key features of abnormal performance in the UK pension fund industry. First, a variety of benchmark corrections suggests that few funds have robustly measured extreme abnormal performance, with the evidence for outperformance stronger than that for underperformance, a possible artifact of survivorship bias. The second fact strikes us as of greater economic signi¯cance: the shape of the cross-sectional distribution of average raw total and asset class returns are broadly una®ected by risk adjustment, with even extreme ranges such as the 5th-95th percentile spread virtually unchanged. Cross-sectional variation in risk exposures does not appear to conceal crosssectional variation in abnormal performance.
Perhaps fund performance is related to other fund attributes. We consider two natural and related candidates: size and past performance. The former might arise from diseconomies of scale in asset management resulting from market impact, while the latter is not readily detectable using the methods of the previous section. If both prove to be related to abnormal performance, separating these e®ects involves recognizing that current size can be related to past performance.
Fund Size E®ects
A¯nding that larger funds tend to underperform the peer-group would add credence to the often-made claim that size is the anchor of performance. Accordingly, we formed equally-weighted portfolios based on quartiles sorted according to the value of assets at the beginning of each year, starting with the smallest funds. This procedure generated four time series of portfolio returns for each asset class, the abnormal performance of which is presented in Table 3 . Panel A reports the results for multi-index Jensen regressions. A size e®ect is observed most clearly for UK equities. The smallest-fund quartile has a positive alpha and the largest a negative alpha, neither of which is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at conventional levels, but the di®erence between them (0.79%) has a t-statistic of 3.33 and an associated marginal signi¯cance level of less than 0.001. 18 Panel B con¯rms these results using relative performance measurement. Each portfolio has positive mean excess returns relative to the peer-group benchmark, rising from an economically and statistically insigni¯cant 2.7 basis points per year for the large-fund portfolio to 72 basis points per year for the small-fund portfolio. The remaining asset classes reveal no clear pattern save for international bonds and equities, which indicate a direct, rather than an inverse, relationship between fund size and Jensen alpha. 19 Perhaps most importantly, there is no systematic relationship between fund size and abnormal performance for the overall pension fund portfolios.
Nevertheless, the¯nding of an inverse relationship between fund performance and fund size in UK equities could be an important part of the explanation for mandate retention in the UK. UK pension funds hold a very substantial proportion of issued UK equities and large UK funds hold large fractions of their portfolios in UK equities as well. These funds can surely argue that an annual performance di®erential of the order of 70 basis points re°ects the impact of the trading of large funds in a market in which they are important players.
Another possibility is that large funds do not actually underperform relative to smaller ones after management charges are taken into account. To explore this point, we calculated management fees based on the major fund management rms' commission schedules. The management fee on a very small fund is of the order of 50 basis points per year while a very large fund would typically be charged 10 or fewer basis points. Hence, this di®erential cannot be fully explained on a net-of-cost basis.
Past Performance E®ects
Funds can be small because they have just been established or because they were previously large but su®ered substantial losses. Hence, it is obviously of some interest to ascertain whether it is size itself or whether there is a past performance component driving the negative relation between fund size and performance in UK equities. 20 We adopted two approaches to maintain comparability with both the literature and the evidence given above. In the¯rst, we examine the relation between future and past rankings of relative portfolio returns without adjusting for their correlation with one or more indices, an appropriate approach for investors with the bulk of their wealth invested in a single pension scheme. In the second approach, we investigate the persistence of Jensen measures obtained from average asset class returns after correcting for their correlation with the multiple-index benchmark, a more appropriate method for investors with only a fraction of their wealth invested in a particular pension scheme. In essence, this distinction re-°e cts the di®erence between the Sharpe and Jensen-Treynor-Black approaches to the measurement of performance.
We tested for persistence in performance using a variant of the approach employed by Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993). For December of each year, we sorted the funds into four equal-weighted portfolios based on the rank of their abnormal performance measure over the most recent 12-month period. We record their performance over the subsequent year and repeat the procedure every 12 months. Thus we have returns on four portfolios over 96 months (due to the need for the initial abnormal performance estimate.) 21 Panels A and B of Table 4 provide some evidence of persistence in performance only in respect of peer-group comparisons and then only for UK equities and cash/other investments. For the multi-index benchmark case, the individual alphas from the quartile-sorted Jensen regressions are insigni¯cant at conventional levels, although the di®erence between the annualized alphas of the highest and lowest past performance portfolios for UK equities is 126 basis points. This regularity is also re°ected in the peer-group benchmark-adjusted returns, where the corresponding annualized average raw return di®erential for UK equities is 146 basis points. The sample means are also ordered from largest to smallest across the four quartiles.
Panel C of Table 4 provides an alternative characterization of the persistence of abnormal performance. We formed zero net investment portfolios each December by taking a long position in those funds that had positive alphas over the previous year and a short position in those that had negative alphas, and tracked the performance of these constructed portfolios over the subsequent twelve months, in a manner similar to Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross (1992) and Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) . The results remain consistent with the hypothesis that there is measured persistence in UK equity returns. Once again, the magnitude of the e®ect with UK equities is modest, on the order of 0.5 per cent annualized.
Of course, fund size partly re°ects cumulative past performance, while our previous year return measure re°ects recent performance. That these two e®ects are interrelated shows up in portfolio composition: only 15 per cent of the quartile containing the smallest funds were also in the quartile of worst-performing funds, whereas 32 per cent of the largest funds were contained in this quartile. Evidence such as this makes it hard to tell if size is the anchor of current performance or the result of good previous performance.
In an attempt to disentangle the two e®ects, we ran single-index Jensen regressions for each UK equity portfolio, with the portfolio's own (size-adjusted or/and past-performance-adjusted) quartile return included as an additional regressor. This procedure can be justi¯ed on the grounds that the single index regressions omitted some important risk factor and that the betas on the sizeand/or past-performance-adjusted quartile portfolios are constant, although we interpret it as an exercise in data description. The results covering the period 1987-1994 (96 months) are presented in Table 5 . One year of data is lost due to the initial sort. The 5%-95% range for the alpha estimates, based on the standard benchmark regression, is 400 basis points from {1.86 to 2.11 per cent. When the funds' size-sorted-quartile portfolio returns were included in the regression, this range fell substantially to 319 basis points. However, the range only fell to 374 basis points when the corresponding past-performance-sorted portfolios were included. Fund size thus accounts for a non-trivial proportion of the crosssectional variation in abnormal performance, while past performance does not.
Perhaps size is the anchor of performance.
Conclusion
As in the US, UK pension fund managers typically underperform external benchmarks that represent feasible passive investment vehicles. Yet there are some striking di®erences between the fund management industries in the two countries. The industry is much more highly concentrated in the UK than in the US and relative performance evaluation at both the individual fund manager and fund management group levels has a more signi¯cant impact on investment strategies and outcomes. In particular, there is little cross-sectional variation in the average total or asset class returns, however adjusted for risk, of the funds in our sample. Only fund size can account for a nontrivial fraction of this distribution and then only for the case of UK equities.
Fee structures provide a disincentive to undertake active management. UK pension fund managers are set the objective of adding value but their fees are generally related to the year-end asset values, not to performance. Genuine ex ante ability that translates into superior ex post performance increases assets under management and, thus, the base on which the management fee is calculated. However, this incentive is not particularly strong and active management subjects the manager to nontrivial risks. The incentive is weak because the prospective fee increase is second order, being the product of the ex post return from active management and the management fee and thus around two full orders of magnitude smaller than the base fee itself. Moreover, the ex post return from active management of a truly superior fund manager will often be negative and occasionally large as well, resulting in poor performance relative to managers who eschewed active management irrespective of their ability. The probability of relative underperformance large enough to lose the mandate is likely to be at least an order of magnitude larger than the proportional management fee. Hence, the risk of underperformance due to poor luck outweighs the prospective bene¯ts from active management for all but the most certain security selection or market timing opportunities.
Thus the cross-sectional regularities we document are probably related to the incentive e®ects of the fee structures, the performance evaluation environment operating, and the degree of concentration in the UK pension fund industry during our time period. Money manager performance was measured on a relative basis, an evaluation procedure that placed more than two-thirds of managers in the upper half of the comparison universe, and managers of large funds could argue that their fund size and not their own ability diminished their equity performance. Hence, most managers could point to their above average performance or to plausible reasons for underperformance. Thus it is perhaps unsurprising that managers produced remarkably little cross-sectional variation in overall ex post performance and were generally able to retain their mandates and the associated management fees. See, e.g., Jensen (1972) , Admati, Bhattacharya, P°eiderer, and Ross (1986), Lehmann and Modest (1987) , and Grinblatt and Titman (1989) Since the t-statistics of these alphas are interdependent and there are more alphas than time series observations, we cannot construct a joint test of their signi¯cance. Moreover, the joint test has low power if a small subset of the alphas di®ers from zero in the population, as we would expect a priori on the hypothesis that abnormal performance is not pervasive. For both reasons, we report p-values based on the Bonferroni inequality, which in this case states that the marginal signi¯cance of the largest t-statistic in absolute value is less than ¼ when its p-value is ¼/N, where N is the number of t-statistics examined simultaneously.
Following Fama and MacBeth (1973) , the standard error of this average alpha was computed from the time series of returns on the equal-weighted portfolio, ignoring the small downward bias associated with the omission of the sample squared Sharpe ratio of the index, c.f.
Shanken (1992).
! The cross-sectional variation in the unconditional betas was trivial as re°ected in the semiinterquartile range in sample betas of 0.99 to 1.01. Also, the location of the individual alpha estimates within their cross-sectional distribution proved quite robust across risk-adjustment procedures. For example, using the unconditional and the conditional Jensen procedures, the cross-sectional rank-correlation between the funds' mean (raw) excess returns and their alpha estimates was 0.99 and 0.88, respectively.
" All exceed the average UK pension fund mandate length of 7.25 years (Prosser (1995) ).
# We did not¯t versions of time-varying beta models or of Treynor-Mazuy regressions here since either approach would greatly increase the number of parameters, straining an already modest-sized sample.
$ These comprise UK and international equities and bonds, index bonds, cash and UK property; there was no benchmark available for international property over the sample.
% As noted earlier, the asset classes might have biases associated with value weighting and
